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Abstract
Digital startups’ use of AI technologies has
significantly increased in recent years, bringing to the
fore specific barriers to deployment, use, and extraction
of business value from AI. Utilizing a quantitative
framework regarding the themes of startup growth and
scaling, we examine the scaling behavior of AI,
platform, and service startups. We find evidence of a
sublinear scaling ratio of revenue to age-discounted
employment count. The results suggest that revenueemployee growth pattern of AI startups is close to that
of service startups, and less so to that of platform
startups. Furthermore, we find a superlinear growth
pattern of acquired funding in relation to the
employment size that is largest for AI startups, possibly
suggesting hype tendencies around AI startups. We
discuss implications in the light of new economies of
scale and scope of AI startups related to decisionmaking and prediction.

1. Introduction
Artificial Intelligence (AI) unicorns 1 , such as
Google DeepMind, SenseTime, and UIPath have
unlocked growth at an unprecedented pace. Networks
and AI are reshaping the operational foundations of
firms, enabling digital scale, scope, and learning, and
simultaneously erasing deep-seated limits that have
constrained firm growth and impact for hundreds of
years [1]. AI startups seem to be able to extend the
known types of scaling up, e.g., by being able to transfer
potent machine learning models to other business use
cases [2] or by providing new kinds of services that
outperform humans in terms of perception and cognition
[3]. We conceptualize growth as the process of
changing in relevant measures of firm size and scaling
as the relation of concepts to each other within the
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growth processes. Achieving substantial growth and the
ability to scale accordingly is a crucial point for startups,
especially in regards to obtaining funding, maintaining
productivity and enriching the diffusion of new product
and technological innovations [4].
Given their potential, it seems important to consider
why AI startups do not always scale like traditional
software and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) companies.
Current Information Systems (IS) studies stress the
potential barriers for creating value with AI
technologies, such as unclear business cases for AI
implementations, lack of leadership support and limited
technological capabilities [5, 6]. They point to both the
need for talent and access to data as well as the ability
to capture value from AI applications. Indeed, recent
industry reports point towards similar scaling problems
stressing the expenses for cloud infrastructure usage and
the problems of initial AI model setup that stem from
data quality issues and unclear specifications [7].
Current observations paint the picture of AI startups as
having to put a great deal of time into optimizing their
AI models and collecting relevant data within the first
two years [8] – effectively rendering their growth rate
more similar to that of a traditional service company
than to a platform or software company that can rely
more on existing ready-to-use frameworks. For
instance, many AI startups in the field of digital health
focus on service business models before developing a
more scalable approach [9].
At the core of these considerations is the question of
whether there exist substantial differences between the
“AI” and more classical digital startups and if so, how
they can also be measured empirically. Hence the
research question of this paper is: How do AI startups
scale compared to non-AI startups? This is important
for both management and investors since the current
hype around AI falls short in describing the growth
process of AI startups; yet and moreover, risks with
regards to the initial phase of an AI startup tend to be

1 Unicorn is a market term characterizing a newly founded firm that
had rapidly grown to a private valuation of a billion or more US
dollars [19]
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more concealed. Those AI startups are contrasted with,
succinctly put, non-AI startups, especially those with a
platform or service model, which does not indicate
involvement of AI as a core of their business model.
Drawing on a rich body of literature regarding platform
and service startups, we theorize on how the mentioned
types of startups should be able to scale compared to AI
startups. Current reports provide indications that AI
startups may scale more like traditional service
companies tend to despite the big scaling potential of AI
startups due to data network effects [8].
Our study uses data sets collected from the largescale content aggregator Crunchbase 2 . Employing a
quantitative predictive framework for growth and
scaling, we analyze how size measures scale in relation
to selected business measures, i.e. revenues and
acquired funds, using OLS regression on a dataset of
12,373 AI startups, 11,839 platform startups and 24,401
professional service startups to examine group
differences. We find that all types of startups show
sublinear growth in terms of size and revenue and
superlinear growth in terms of size and acquired
funding. Additionally, taking into account the startups’
age, we find that higher revenue is about as closely
connected with more employees for AI startups as it is
for service startups.
Our methodology allows for the quantification of
scaling characteristics for different startup ventures. The
empirical results provide critical arguments over
phenomena of new economies of scale and scope of AI
startups. First, we provide quantifiable differences
between AI and non-AI startups. We then link the
specific need for use of human resources in the process
of scaling up among the different startup types. On
average, AI startups seem to need more human
resources in order to scale than platform startups and
about as many as service startups do.

2. Growth and Scaling Characteristics of
AI Startups
Growth of startups has been conceptualized in prior
research, and we will briefly examine key findings
relevant for AI scaling. We describe both growth and
scaling while focusing on the growth characteristics of
AI-based startups in comparison to two other startup
types, i.e. platform and service. Our aim is to present a
quantitative framework that allows for measuring
growth and scaling differences between the three
aforementioned startup types.

2.1 Digital Startups and Growth
We conceptualize growth as the process of changing
in relevant measures of size, this includes: sales
revenue, employees, and operating profits. Growth is
deeply embedded in the scientific interests of
entrepreneurship, so much so that it is sometimes
included in the distinction between startups and small
enterprises [10]. As a result, startups have been
conceptualized as young, growth-oriented firms that
engage in innovative behavior [11].
From this vantage point, digital startups can be
further described as firms that market, deliver, and
support a digital product or service online [12]. Digital
startups rely on aspects of digital media and IT to pursue
market opportunities [13]. They often do this by using
emerging digital technologies such as AI, machine
learning, deep learning, natural language processing, big
data analytics, virtual reality, IoT platforms, 3D
printing, or cloud computing [14, 15]. The important
function of digital technology for startups lies in at least
three different roles [16]: Digital startups may use
digital technologies as a context, an enabler, or an
outcome of their business. As a context, digital
technologies help a startup coordinate, communicate,
lead, organize, plan, and control. As an enabler, they
facilitate better tangible and intangible methods of
decision-making. As an outcome, digital technologies
are the product or service the company produces, such
as in delivering software to customers or producing
hardware. Overall, digital startups make situated use of
these three possible roles for IT to scale their venture.
Regarding such digital technologies, it is still widely
discussed which occasions create the affordances for
faster growth [17]. Fast growing digital startups often
show significant traction enrolling customers, a
validated business model and higher total funding than
slower growing startups [18]. However, what makes
digital business models easier to scale is that the
marginal cost of serving an additional user on many
digital networks is, for all purposes, zero, apart from the
small incremental cost of (cloud) computing capacity
[1]. At the same time, where low entry costs and
plentiful capital is often available to digital startups, the
entry barriers are thus quite low, resulting in an very
large number of entrants into this specific market of
startups [19]. Thus, Kenney and Zysman [19] argue that
the competition ignites an equity-consuming race to
build a market.
An important aspect of these growth processes is that
different business sectors show different setup times,
adoption speeds, sales cycles, and market opportunities.

2 https://www.crunchbase.com/
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There has already been some research on growth
mechanisms of specific types of non-AI digital startups,
such as platform startups (e.g., [20–23]) and
professional service startups (e.g, [24–26]). Huang et al.
[20] summed up the mechanisms of rapid growth of an
innovative platform startup as (i) being data-driven, (ii)
being able to release and launch modifications instantly
and (iii) being able to swiftly transform novel value-inuse—and therefore able to reduce marginal costs for
every new customer to close to zero.
In contrast, professional service startups are
characterized by high knowledge intensity, low capital
intensity, and professionalized workforces [27]. Such
workforces, as well as the increasing capital intensity in
the context of ongoing digitization, often still prevent
them from rapid growth in the early years of their startup
[26]. At the same time, the need for professional service
providers is growing given an increasing knowledge
demand in a technological society, putting ever more
pressure on the need for an expertise in how to manage
this knowledge [26].

2.2 Growth of AI Startups
The focus of this paper is on AI startups. We define
an AI startup as a digital startup having AI as a core
component of its business model. This means that while
we consider startups where AI is an enabler or outcome
of the business model, we do not consider digital
startups as AI startups where AI technology merely acts
as the context to improve its work processes [16].
Examples of AI startups include companies in
categories such as machine learning [28–30], intelligent
systems [31–33], natural language processing [34–38],
and predictive analytics [39–42].
When considering the growth of AI startups, prior
literature has pointed out two vital aspects. First, AI has
been characterized as the next general purpose
technology to be attributed with the property of enabling
significant complementary investments, which include
business process redesign, co-invention of new business
models, and human capital [3]. To be even more
specific, potent AI models allow for a high prediction
quality and can therefore consistently identify and meet
customer requirements [43]. In addition, it has been
pointed out that once a mature AI model is set up, it has
the potential for being transferred to other business use
cases within the enterprise [1]. Second, Gregory et al.
[8] stress the importance of data network effects for
creating user value. This is a pertinent value to
complement those well-documented direct and indirect
network effects. Data network effects occur when the
more that the AI platform learns from the data it collects
on users, the more valuable the AI platform becomes to

each user. In turn, just as Andrew Ng [44] observed,
talent and data seem to be the most scarce, yet crucial
resources for a flourishing AI startup.
Both IS literature and industry reports indicate
common issues for AI startups: As Berente et al. pointed
out, there is significant uncertainty for businesses
regarding how to manage AI [6]. It adds a level of
complexity that surpasses traditional, less data-intense
IT applications [45]. Alsheibani, Cheung, and Messom
[5] highlight barriers for creating and capturing value
using AI technologies, such as unclear business cases
for AI implementations, lack of leadership support, and
limited technological capabilities. These aspects not
only point to the need for a solid backbone of skillful
developers, an adequate toolset and a model that is
trained on unique data but also to the fact that there
seems to be a lack of clarity about how to extract
business value from the use of unfolding AI
technologies. Furthermore, current industry reports
underline practical problems stemming from the
mentioned issues [7]: First, expensive cloud
infrastructure usage that requires ongoing human
support is often required. Second, a great number of
edge cases pose a problem for the initial model setup—
it has been surmised that AI lives in the long tail [46].
Lastly, defensive moats are weaker due to the
commoditization of AI models and algorithms.
Considering these uncertainties, we present in the
following subsection a way to quantitatively measure
and predict the properties of the scaling behavior of AI
startups.

2.3 Quantifying the Scaling Characteristics of
AI Startups
In this subsection, we aim to unearth certain
universal principles regarding growth and scaling of
startups that could, in turn, provide a basis for a
quantitative predictive framework. For starters, we
define scaling as how size-related concepts relate to
each other during the growth process, such as the
relation of the number of employees and the operating
profits of startups. Scaling, therefore, refers to how the
individual components of a system respond when its
size changes [47]. Scaling arguments can lead to a deep
understanding of the dynamics of the system of our
interest, especially if it is a continuously evolving
complex adaptive system, such as the organizational
structure of a startup.
According to Bettencourt et al. [48], there are three
types of scaling dynamics. Sublinear scaling
characterizes sigmoidal growth that eventually
converges to the carrying capacity N. The driving forces
put in more economic terms are efficiency, savings in
size or economies of scale [47]. The slope β of the
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corresponding
log-transformed
regression line
describing the relationship of the scaling variables is
smaller than one. Linear scaling characterizes growth
that is exponential since the relative or percentage
growth rate is constant. The slope of the corresponding
log-transformed regression line equals one. Superlinear
scaling characterizes growth that diverges within a finite
time t. In economic discourse, superlinear growth often
describes increasing returns to scale, as well as selfreinforcing growth mechanisms that lead to unbounded
growth—or a boom. Of course, if resources get sparse,
superlinear dynamics are necessarily followed by a
collapse. The slope of the corresponding logtransformed regression is greater than one.
The scaling perspective has been put to use in the
field of biology in order to characterize the growth
properties of human and animal ecosystems [49–51] and
in the field of urban growth [48, 52]. While scaling
theory has not been widely used in the management and
IS literature, there are a few notable works. Axtell [53]
deployed an agent-based model in which the theory
serves as an input for assumption formation. The
simulation model analyzes endogenous firm dynamics
and labor flows via heterogeneous agents. Another
study that deployed a scaling perspective to analyze the
dependence of growth on company size, and derived
from all US traded manufacturing companies from 1975
to 1991 a model wherein the probability of a company's
growth depends on its past and present sales accounts
[54].
Furthermore, the scaling theory has been used by
West [47] to measure the scaling behavior of publicly
traded companies using the Compustat dataset. West
discovered sublinear scaling of employees and net
income. This sublinear scaling mechanism hints at a
pattern of bureaucratic control, which is typically
needed to administer the execution of the company's
operational business model, within an ever growing
organizational structure. When applying the scaling
perspective to digital startups one is advised to bear in
mind that entrepreneurial ecosystems are a much more
turbulent and less predictable object of consideration
than bigger companies [55]. Yet, losing some of its
predictive quality, the theory can give insights into the
different scaling behaviors of varying types of startups.
When comparing the growth characteristics of AI
startups with the two non-AI startups types (platform
and service startups), we find an indication that AI
startups might scale faster than service startups, as their
marginal costs for more sales units is linked with
employing more consultants3. However, in congruence,

AI startups may scale slower than platform startups as
the marginal costs for one sales unit are close to zero for
the latter.

3. The Data
We use Crunchbase database, which is an opensource directory containing community-generated data
on global technology startups and investors. We used
the Crunchbase ‘business group’ categories to gather
three classes of startups (AI, platform, and service
startups). In addition, we would remove startups from
one group if they also appeared in one of the other two
groups in order to make the classes mutually exclusive.
Together these comprised, respectively, 12,373, 11,839
and 24,401 individual startups with a maximum age of
10 years.
We considered three variables as relevant for our
scaling analysis: the number of employees, the
estimated revenue range, and the total amount of
funding. The table in Appendix 1 shows a summary of
the descriptive statistics for those variables, as
considered in our model for each of the examined
startup types. The differences in the number of
observations stem from missing values in the
Crunchbase dataset regarding the three mentioned
variables.
The average number of employees is larger by a
factor of roughly two for those service startups in
comparison to AI and platform startups. Note that the
startups of all three groups differ in their average age
(4.2, 6.9, and 5.9 years for AI, platform, and service
startups). We made use of an age-weight in an additional
analysis, in order to consider this temporal dimension.
Regarding the total amount of funding, the median
seems to give a better picture in terms of not letting
outliers distort the average amount: The median funding
amount for AI startups is more than three times that of
platform startups and 1⅔ times that of service startups.
Regarding reliability of the Crunchbase dataset, we
found that this platform tightly monitors their data. In
particular, Crunchbase takes three means to ensure data
curation [56]: First, the editors are part of the business
to control for face value validity of the data. Second,
Crunchbase uses machine-learning algorithms to
compare data against publicly available information.
Finally, data analysts recruited by Crunchbase take
manual care of data validation. Being able to give basic
trust to the data sources, we will subsequently present
the methodology used to analyze the data in this paper.

3 Or as Anne Marie Neatham, COO of Ocado Technology put it:
“Human beings can do everything that AI can do. They just can’t do
it to scale.”, found in [1]
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Table 1. Scaling exponents for business metrics vs. measurements of startup sizes
Startup size X

Business Metric Y

Number of employees Estimated size of revenue
Age-discounted number
Estimated size of revenue
of employees
Number of employees Total sum of funding
Age-discounted number
Total sum of funding
of employees

In the following, we apply a scaling analysis as
sketched in subsection 2.3. Note that we are treating
ordinal data as continuous to perform a log-transformed
regression analysis. The argument to do so is following
the assumption that the numerical distance between each
set of subsequent categories is close enough to each
other in our analysis. Consequently, the results will be
rendered as close to reality as possible.

4. Results
The scaling analysis in this section is comprised of
two main steps: comparing the scaling behavior of (i)
the number of employees vs. the estimated revenue, and
(ii) comparing the number of employees vs. the total
sum of funding. For both steps, we first consider the size
in total and, second, we examine the age-discounted
firm size. Summary results for selected exponents are
presented in Table 1, and scaling relationships are
visualized in Figure 2.
The figures show the regression line and confidence
margins for the log-transformed variables as well as the
slope β of the log-transformed regression line. Using a
measure N of startup size at time t, power law scaling
takes the form Y(t) = Y0N(t) β. Y denotes a business
metric, which is either the estimated size of revenue or
total sum of funding; Y0 is a normalization constant. The
exponent β reflects dynamic rules at play across the
startups: It can be understood as an increase in the size
N of the startup with a factor of one, which will lead to
an average increase in the corresponding business
metric by a factor of β. We will elaborate on the
individual results in the following paragraphs.
The first analysis compares the startup’s number of
employees with its estimated revenue. We find sublinear
scaling for all startup groups. The differences in the
respective scaling exponents is still striking. We found
the slope of our regression line for AI startups (0.31) to
be higher by a factor of roughly 1.5 than that of platform
startups (0.20). The slope of service startups in turn is

Group
AI
Platform
Service
AI
Platform
Service
AI
Platform
Service
AI
Platform
Service

β
0.32
0.20
0.43
0.30
0.24
0.31
1.30
1.06
1.06
1.31
1.06
1.08

Adj-R²
0.12
0.05
0.23
0.12
0.07
0.13
0.36
0.24
0.28
0.35
0.24
0.28

N
1,989
5,047
7,016
1,912
3,838
5,115
3,081
1,204
2,389
2.942
1,194
2,371

higher by 0.12 than for AI startups. Taking into account
the higher baseline value for AI startups with small team
sizes (below 10), the result suggests that marginal
revenue is more tightly coupled with an increase in the
number of employees for service startups than for AI
startups.
We included the same analysis but with an agediscounted employee count to account for the temporal
aspect of the startups’ age. The age-discounted
employee function f(x,y) ≜ 𝑥 ∗ e α*y with x being the
number of employees, y being the startup age, and
α being a weighting factor. The weighting factor α was
set to 0.05 after testing the robustness of different
models. The results show that among service startups,
the slope drops noticeably to 0.31 while the slope of AI
startups does not change nearly as much. This may
suggest that age plays a more drastic role in increasing
revenue for service startups than it would for AI
startups.
The next analysis depicts the scaling of the total
amount of funding compared to the number of
employees. The results show superlinear scaling
dynamics for all three startup types. As expected, AI
startups have the steepest increase of funding with
employment growth (β = 1.30), followed by platform
and service startups with an equal slope (β = 1.06). In
addition, the median of the total funding for AI is about
three times higher than for platform start-ups and about
1.5 times higher than for service start-ups. The same
analysis with an age-discounted employee count
produces nearly the same results—this suggests the
minor role of the temporal aspect concerning startup
size in the scaling mechanism of the acquired funding.
The results seem to stress the ability to acquire
substantially higher funding for AI startups.
It is striking that the explained variance for the
funding is significantly higher than for revenue. This is
reasonable since funding can be put to use immediately
in order to gather more resources whereas revenue may
be bound to certain commitments [19]. However, as the
variable revenue still explains a reasonable amount of
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Figure 2. Scaling relationships for AI (red), platform (green), and service startups (blue): (a) the
estimated amount of revenue vs. the number of employees, which scales sublinearly and (b) the
total amount of funding vs. the number of employees, which scales superlinearly
the overall variance and because the differences in the
effect strengths are so vastly different for the startup
groups, we believe it is an insightful variable in terms of
group comparison.
We included two further analyses by (i) splitting up
the data geographically into Europe, Northern America
and Asian-Pacific and (ii) examining different business
categories of AI startups and included the results in
Appendix 2. The regional analysis regarding revenue (i)
reveals close to no differences for service startups but
does demonstrate larger differences for platform and AI
startups, namely: The beta coefficient is smallest for
Northern America (AI: 0.23; platform: 0.18) and highest
for Asian-Pacific (AI: 0.42; platform: 0.44) with Europe
in between (AI: 0.29; platform: 0.25). Since the average
value of the target variable is close to similar for the
three categories, this may hint at a connection between
employees and revenue that is much smaller in the US.
In terms of funding, the regional differences are much
smaller. The business category analysis for AI startups
(ii) reveals that in the FinTech and the Health Care
sector employees and revenue are connected most
closely. Since these sectors are heavily regulated,
market entry and data sharing prove to be especially
difficult [9, 57]. Regarding funding amount, the more
traditional sectors of Analytics and E-Commerce are
less likely to gain more funding when having more
employees.
We ran several robustness checks to rule out other
explanations. First, we cutoff revenue outliers at
different top percentages to control for possible
distortions by the most performant startups. With a 10%
cutoff, the slope for every startup group dropped
similarly by around 3% (AI startups) to 5% (service
startups). Second, grouping the startups by age and
running the same analyses shows that both the

predictive quality and the slope β rise with a higher
startup age, which is in line with the theory that bigger
companies more consistently need more personnel in
order to scale [47].

5. Discussion
The previous section revealed sublinear scaling
dynamics for the estimated sum of revenue in relation to
the startup size for all three startup types. This result is
in line with that of West’s [47] analysis regarding the
scaling behavior of publicly traded companies we have
referred to in subsection 2.3. Note that young startups
will, of course, find it easier than larger companies to
grow their revenues at higher percentage rates since it is
the case that a small number is easier to double than a
large one.
Regarding the group comparison between AI
startups with platform and service startups, we find that
marginal increase of revenue is linked less closely to the
number of employees for AI startups than for the service
startups, but more closely linked than that found for the
platform startups. However, when incorporating the
temporal aspect of a startup’s age, the effect size for
service startups is reduced to roughly the same amount
as that of AI startups, while the effect size of platform
startups is considerably lower. This hints to the
argument that the necessity for humans-in-the-loop is
much less present for platform startups than for the other
two startup types. In particular, AI startups seem to need
nearly as much personnel to scale as service startups
appear to.
Furthermore, we find a superlinear growth pattern of
acquired funding in relation to the startup size for all
startups in our sample. The effect is biggest for the AI
startup type hinting to the ever-rising popularity of AI
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Figure 3. Increase of Crunchbase business
categories from 2017 to 2019 for a sample of
300 (a) AI startups and (b) service startups
matched with the AI startups according to
their company size and revenue
an experience reflected in the number of investors in
recent years [58].
Our findings pose interesting questions regarding
new economies of scale and scope [1] in the growth
process of AI startups. Scale effects occur when a firm’s
operating model is designed to cope with greater
volume, complexity, and number of customers [1].
Scope effects are defined by the range of activities
provided by a firm as measured by the number of
products or services provided. A firm’s operating model
supports scope through having centralized functions or
using advanced technologies [1]. IS literature has
documented the important role of ‘scaling the user base’
for stimulating successful venture creation [20, 59],
while being less concerned with scaling through other
means such as data (see for exceptions [60, 61]). Thus,
AI has been associated with new economies of scale [1,
43], but beyond user scaling recent accounts have
emphasized the role of data at scale [43, 62]. While it is
not entirely clear whether the business value of large
data has unlimited positive returns [43, 63], access to
enough relevant data is unquestionably a bottleneck
factor for many AI startups to scale.
Some IS and innovation management accounts,
which focus on platform firms have emphasized the role
of scope effects in configuring diverse resources and
knowledge into a coherent ecosystem [23, 64]. Certain
researchers have argued that the increasing variety in
different use cases makes AI (or specific forms, such as
deep learning) a general purpose technology [65–67].

This means that AI is not limited to particular use cases
or application domains, but transformative to many
industries and domains [1]. This points to new scope
effects where AI technologies remove bottlenecks, thus
enabling startups to be less loyal to industry boundaries
and transfer potent models to other sectors.
We find evidence for this in the form of a massive
increase in business categories of AI startups compared
to service startups. Figure 3 provides an overview of the
increase of business categories from 2017 to 2019 for a
sample of 300 (a) AI startups and (b) service startups
that were matched to them according to their size and
revenue. An alternative explanation for this
phenomenon could be the hype surrounding such AI
technology [68], which has resulted in many startups
deliberately choosing to integrate either AI technologies
or, at minimum, the AI technology labels.
Our results from the scaling analysis provide first
empirical evidence that - on a large scale - the scaling
behavior of AI startups does not differ substantially
from service startups in terms of the need for human
resources. Although both kinds of startups scale
significantly differently than platform startups tend to,
this is mainly due to having bigger teams not being as
significantly connected with higher revenue. This points
to AI startups having indeed a higher need for investing
in human resource. The literature has consistently
identified the two most common features of AI and
digital platform startups regarding scaling dynamics: an
operating model that allows for near to zero marginal
costs for acquiring new customers [1, 69] and the much
discussed network effects [8, 70]. Since there are
measurable differences in the scaling behavior, an
interesting research opportunity would be to further
tease out those differences in the underlying
mechanisms.

6. Conclusion
We aimed to better understand growth and scaling
dynamics of AI startups. Using a large data set from
Crunchbase, we analyzed the scaling behavior of AI
startups and compared it to platform and professional
service startups—making use of a quantitative,
predictive framework. We found sublinear growth of
revenue and superlinear growth of the total sum of
funding both in a relation to the startup size as measured
by the number of employees. Regarding the group
comparison, we found that the marginal increase of
revenue is as closely connected to employee count for
AI startups as it is for service startups. Platform startups,
on the other hand, seem to require less human resources
for them to scale. Gregory et al [8] highlight the
importance of data in the first place and respective data
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network effects. In extension, we show that limited data
availability and efforts for configuring the AI model
may cause AI startups to need more people in order to
grow during their first years. For management and
investors, it is important to understand that data and AI
model setup are crucial considerations for the first years
of oversight and that these points potentially limit
growth posing a risk to survival.
Our paper is not without limitations. First, the ‘label’
AI has been used to identify AI startups and to
distinguish them from other types of startups. While
data is well curated in Crunchbase further research
should cross-validate whether the label and reality fit.
Second, we focused on companies included in
Crunchbase, which might have introduced a survival
bias since being present in this data source may already
be an indicator of a successful venture. Nevertheless,
since our focus lies on digital entrepreneurs, we believe
the large sample from Crunchbase can provide a
comprehensive picture of the regarded startup types.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Variable Type, Range and Distribution
Variable

Type and range

Group

Rank distribution
(number of startups in parenthesis)
Number Grouped; range
AI
5 (4,773); 25 (2,740); 75 (272); 175
of
represented by average:
(175); 250 (51); N = 7,986
employee 5: (0,10] empl.
Platform 5 (5,873); 25 (2,327); 75 (320); 175
s
25: (10, 50] empl.
(142); 250 (113); N = 8,775
75: (50, 100] empl.
Service 5 (9,487); 25 (4,956); 75 (858); 175
175: (100, 250] empl.
(1028); 250 (650); N = 16,979
250: >250 empl.
Estimated Grouped; range
AI
$1M (931); $5M (1,138); $30M (52);
revenue represented by group
$75M (6); N = 2,127
range
average
Platform $1M (2,409); $5M (2,776); $30M (180);
$1M: 1 M$ (or less)
$75M (26); $250M (17);
$5M: (1,10] M$
N = 5,408
$30M: (10,50] M$
Service $1M (3,721); $5M (3,279); $30M (785);
$75M: (50,100] M$
$75M (96); $250M (80);
$250M: (100,500] M$
N = 7,961
Total
Continuous Values
AI
N = 3,549
amount of
funding
Platform N = 1,387

Service

N = 2,852

Descriptive statistics
Avg: 18.00; SD: 32.16;
CI0.05: [18.30, 19.71]
Avg: 18.76; SD: 36.55
CI0.05: [18.00, 19.53]
Avg: 34.05; SD: 59.74
CI0.05: [33.15, 34.95]

Q0.25: 5; Mdn: 5
Q0.75: 25
Q0.25: 5; Mdn: 5
Q0.75: 25
Q0.25: 5; Mdn: 5
Q0.75: 25

Avg: 3,865,068.2; SD: 4,606,137
CI0.05: [3,669,206; 4,060,929]
Avg: 4,990,569.5; SD: 15,255,475
CI0.05: [4,583,889; 5,397,249]

Q0.25: 1M; Mdn: 5M
Q0.75: 5M
Q0.25: 1M; Mdn: 5M
Q0.75: 5M

Avg: 8,408,617; SD: 26,413,412
CI0.05: [7,828,314; 8,988,920]

Q0.25: 1M; Mdn: 5M
Q0.75: 5M

Avg: 18,375,499; SD: 163,799,459 Q0.25: 333,666; Mdn:1.6M
CI0.05: [12,984,668; 23,766,330]
Q0.75: 5.845.000
Avg: 21,336,39; SD: 246,667,547
CI0.05: [8,343,636; 34,329,149]

Q0.25: 100,000;
Mdn: 500,000
Q0.75: 250,000
Avg: 33,505,429; SD: 416,917,899 Q0.25: 143,875
CI0.05: [18,197,788; 48,813,071]
Mdn: 993,500
Q0.75: 5,000,000

Appendix 2: Startups by Different Locations and AI Startups by Different Business Categories
Startup size Business
X
Metric Y

Group

AI
Estimated
No. of
size of
employees
revenue

Platfor
m
Service

AI
Number of Total sum of Platfor
employees funding
m
Service

Location
North America
Europe
Asia-Pacific
North America
Europe
Asia-Pacific
North America
Europe
Asia-Pacific
North America
Europe
Asia-Pacific
North America
Europe
Asia-Pacific
North America
Europe
Asia-Pacific

β
0.23
0.29
0.42
0.18
0.25
0.44
0.37
0.38
0.37
1.20
1.15
1.34
1.03
1.12
0.89
1.09
0.98
0.88

AdjR²
0.08
0.12
0.29
0.03
0.06
0.14
0.17
0.20
0.16
0.39
0.36
0.39
0.26
0.27
0.12
0.33
0.25
0.16

N
963
467
200
1,911
593
573
3,222
808
728
1,509
852
350
632
210
139
1,113
458
349

Startup size Business
X
Metric Y

Business Category

Machine Learning
Big Data
Analytics
SaaS
Estimated
FinTech
Number of
size of
employees
Robotics
revenue
E-Commerce
Marketing
Medical
Autonomous Vehicles
Machine Learning
Big Data
Analytics
SaaS
Number of Total sum FinTech
employees of funding Robotics
E-Commerce
Marketing
Medical
Autonomous Vehicles

β
0.26
0.26
0.29
0.27
0.43
0.22
0.23
0.20
0.34
0.29
1.23
1.27
1.09
1.13
1.28
1.31
1.09
1.19
1.32
1.37

Adj- N
R²
0.10 887
0.08 362
0.11 333
0.11 255
0.23 128
0.07 100
0.07
82
0.04
71
0.16
48
0.15
37
0.37 1,506
0.40 451
0.34 413
0.38 417
0.44 211
0.44 152
0.23 136
0.44
89
0.42
85
0.50
69
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